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By Michael T. Morley
Your children are not safe anywhere, at any time.
-Message from the serial sniper
The person or the people involved in this have shown a
clear willingness and ability to kill people of all ages, all
races, all genders, all professions, at different times, on
different days, and at different locations.
-Montgomery County Police Chief Charles Moose
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petition, sponsored by the ABA's Criminal Justice Section. He is
now clerking fr Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Morleo was awaned a $2,000
cash prize, which was presented in August during the Section lun-
cheon at the ABA Annual Meeting in San Francisco, along with a
one-yearfree membership in the Section. His winning entry "To
Catch a Killer," was selected by a panel that included a judge, a
prosecutor, and a public defender For irnrmation on the 2004
contest, visit the Section Web site at vi'wwabanet.og/crinjust/
home.html and click on the "Law Student" tah.
ith the war in Iraq and the spread of the mysteriousSARS disease still fresh in people's minds, the terror
W that gripped the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area in
the midst of a serial sniper's rampage in October 2002 to many
seems like nothing more than a hazy memory. It is easy to forget
the feelings of fear and helplessness that pervaded the region
during the killing spree that led to one of the largest manhunts in
American law enforcement history. One tactic used in the inves-
tigation was the establishment of roadblocks along nearby major
highways in the wake of shootings. There were two ways such
roadblocks could have been conducted - police could have
stopped all cars (an "all-cars roadblock"), or they could have
stopped only white vans with ladders on their roofs (a "vans-
only roadblock"), the type of vehicle in which the sniper was re-
portedly traveling. The Fourth Amendment, which governs both
state and federal officials, see Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), would apply to either approach because a compulsory
stop of an automobile at a checkpoint, even if 'the resulting de-
tention [is] quite brief,' is a type of "seizure." (Delaware V.
Prvuse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also Brower v. hvo
County, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989).)
Assuming the police may pull over a vehicle, they may also
look through its windows for incriminating evidence because
"[tihere is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that
portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed
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from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or dili-
gent police officers." (Brown v. Texas, 460 U.S. 730,740 (1983).)
Police may even briefly question the occupants of properly de-
tained vehicles. (See Mollica v. Volker, 229 F3d 366, 371 (2d Cir.
2000).) A separate Fourth Amendment issue arises, however, if
police go beyond these measures to conduct full-fledged searches
of the cars. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51
(1925), the Court held that it would be "unreasonable ... [to]
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconve-
nience and indignity of such a search." In general, warrantless
searches of automobiles must be supported by probable cause.
(Jd. at 155-56.)
This article addresses the permissibility, under federal and
state constitutional law, of the initial detention and more exten-
sive searches of vehicles at both all-cars and vans-only road-
blocks. It begins by examining whether the temporary detention
of cars at sniper checkpoints can be justified as "special needs"
seizures that may be performed in the absence of individualized
suspicion. This article then considers whether the Fourth Amend-
ment's general requirement of probable cause for automobile
searches applies at sniper checkpoints. Following a brief discus-
sion of how the possibility of domestic terrorism affects these
analyses, this article discusses whether state constitutions have
been interpreted to afford drivers greater protection against sniper
checkpoints.
Caution: roadblock ahead
Ourfiugitive has been on the run for 90 minutes... [Tihat
gives us a radius of six miles. What I want out of each and every
one of you is a hard target search of every gas station, resi-
dence, warehouse, farmhouse, henhouse, outhouse, and dog-
house in that area. Checkpoints go up at fifteen miles. Your fugi-
tive's name is Dr Richard Kimble. Go get him.
-Deputy U.S. Marshal Sam Gerard in the film The Fugitive
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon pvbable cause....
-Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the police may stop
cars at roadblocks, without either a warrant or any degree of indi-
vidualized suspicion, if the checkpoints are intended to further a
"special governmental need" other than "general crime control
ends." (City ofIndianapolis i Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,41,43
(2000).) For example, the Court has upheld sobriety checkpoints
as a way of ensuring highway safety, see Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,454-55 (1990), and immigration
checkpoints near our borders to keep our nation's boundaries se-
cure, see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557
(1976). Nevertheless, the Court struck down a narcotics check-
point at which cars were stopped so officers could look through
their windows for illegal drugs. It held that the narcotics check-
point's primary purpose-identifying and arresting drug couri-
ers-was indistinguishable from the state's "general interest in
crime control," and so did not further a "special need." (Edmond,
531 U.S. at 44.)
Thus, a critical threshold issue is whether apprehension of a
killer who is likely to strike again is a special need independent of
the government's interest in crime control. There are many fac-
tors that may initially lead one to believe that sniper checkpoints
would fail this test. First, they were run by police officers and
were expressly intended to lead to the sniper's arrest and prosecu-
tion. These were decisive considerations in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), in which the Court considered
the constitutionality of a program at a public hospital under
which urine that had been submitted by pregnant women for oth-
er purposes was tested for illegal drugs. The Court concluded that
the program furthered only the state's general interest in crime
control rather than the special need of protecting unborn children
from drug-related illnesses because it was structured around
"[t]he extensive involvement of law enforcement and the threat of
prosecution." (Id. at 81.) Consequently, it may seem difficult to
argue that sniper roadblocks further a special need other than law
enforcement.
Of course, police involvement is not necessarily fatal to vehi-
cle checkpoints; the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was upheld al-
though it was managed by the police. In Sitz, however, the targets
of the search (drunk drivers) were both violating the law and pos-
ing a serious threat to the safety of others at the time of the brief
seizures. In contrast, even if the serial sniper were fleeing the
scene of a recent shooting, he would be neither committing an of-
fense nor endangering anyone's life while driving away. Even at
the immigration checkpoint upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, U.S.
Border Patrol agents were searching for evidence of an offense
(unlawful presence in the country) actually being committed at
the time of the search; w ith the sniper checkpoints, police were
searching for a person in connection with past and anticipated fu-
ture crimes.
Notwithstanding these important distinctions, there is some-
thing intuitively unappealing about such a formalistic analysis.
The Supreme Court, in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663,
strongly suggested that checkpoints erected for the purpose of
checking drivers' licenses and registrations would be permissible.
It would be odd to conclude that apprehending unlicensed drivers
was a good enough reason for temporarily detaining cars, but
finding the serial sniper was not,
Another important consideration is that the serial sniper made
it clear that he would continue to kill until he was apprehended.
Consequently, the threat to human life he presented brought him
closer to the drunk drivers in Sitz than the drug couriers in Ed-
mond. Finally, the sniper checkpoints were not fishing expedi-
tions to look for anyone who might be breaking a law, but were
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directly aimed at a particular, dangerous fugitive. The Edmond
narcotics checkpoint, in contrast, was invalidated because the
Court refused to "sanction stops justified only by the generalized
and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime." (531
U.S. at 44.) The Middle District of Alabama made a similar point
in distinguishing between roadblocks intended to "uncover gener-
al criminal activity" and roadblocks established "to arrest individ-
uals about whom a grand jury had concluded probable cause ex-
isted as to their involvement with criminal activity:' (United States
v. Davis, 143 E Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2001).)
For these reasons, it can be argued that apprehension of a par-
ticular, dangerous felon believed to be fleeing the area of a recent-
ly committed crime is a special need distinguishable from the
state's generalized interest in crime control. Balancing "the gravi-
ty of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest and the severity of
the interference with individual liberty," the brief invasion of pri-
vacy posed by a checkpoint was outweighed by the need to appre-
hend the sniper. (Bivwn, 443 U.S. at 50-51.) Consequently, nei-
ther a warrant nor probable cause was needed to stop vehicles at
sniper roadblocks, whether they temporarily detained all cars or
only white vans.
The three main federal opinions to consider this issue reached
a similar conclusion. In the words of one court, police may pull
over cars at a roadblock where there is "(1) belief by the officer in-
volved that a crime might have been committed; (2) reasonable
grounds for such a belief, and (3) absolute necessity for immedi-
ate investigatory activity." (United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp.
71,80 (S.D.N.Y 1960).) As the
Fourth Circuit explained, "[The ex-
igency of fleeing, perhaps danger-
ous, suspects ... justifies the mini-
mal intrusion on privacy rights
posed to passing motorists.' (Unit-
edStates v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35,41
(4th Cir. 1980).) The main consider-
ation emphasized by these courts is
not whether there is a reasonable,
articulable basis for pulling over




generally is not--but instead whether there is a reasonable basis
for believing that a serious crime was committed in the area.
(Davis, 143 E Supp. 2d at 1307; see also 3 W LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEzuRE (2d ed.) § 9.5 at 549 (1987).)
Searches at sniper checkpoints
As discussed earlier, although the mobility of automobiles is
an exigency that excuses police from obtaining warrants prior to
searches, the Court generally frowns upon automobile searches
conducted without probable cause. (See Pennsylvania v. Labron,
518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).) For example, although the Court up-
held the brief detention of cars at immigration checkpoints, see
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557, it prevented federal officials
from searching those cars without probable cause because a
search of a vehicle "is a substantial invasion of privacy." (United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975).) Other federal
courts have approved searches of automobiles at fleeing-suspect
checkpoints only when the government demonstrated probable
cause to support them. For instance, in United States v Cusanelli,
the Sixth Circuit upheld a search of defendants' campers "at a
roadblock outside the airport" when two campers were seen be-
ing loaded inside the airport with more than 1,000 pounds of
marijuana. (472 E2d 1204, 1205 (6th Cir. 1973); see also United
States v Klint:, 265 E Supp. 543,548 (S.D.N.Y 1967) (uphold-
ing search of vehicle at police roadblock based upon probable
cause).)
Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Brinegar v United States, ar-
gued that vehicles may be searched at checkpoints, even absent
probable cause, when lives are at stake. He wrote:
[If] a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock
about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car... [tihe
officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching
any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good liith, be-
cause it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity
if it was the only way to detect a vicious crime.
(338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).)
It is not clear, however, that this argument justifies searches of
automobiles at sniper checkpoints. A primary reason the Court
permits the detention of vehicles at checkpoints in the first place
is because "the intrusion on mo-
torists stopped briefly... is slight'"
(Sit-, 496 U.S. at 451.) It should
take more than an articulation of a
o n ofn "special need beyond law enforce-
menf to justify the much greater
is m eant invasion of privacy entailed by a
full-fledged search.
s i ht". I If there were only one major
road leading out of the area of a
shooting, or if the police had rea-
son to believe the sniper would be
using a particular route, this greater invasion of privacy may be
supportable-at least with regard to white vans. Searches of all
cars on all highways within a few miles of a shooting, however, is
precisely the type of dragnet the Fourth Amendment was de-
signed to prevent. Even the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement demands that police demonstrate proba-
ble cause for conducting searches. (See Sctunerber v. Cali/brnia,
384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).) Thus, while all-vehicles checkpoints
are pennissible, suspicionless searches of vehicles detained at
those checkpoints are not. Although this probable cause require-
ment will "predictably deter the police from conducting some
searches that they would otherwise like to conduct... this is not
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an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's protection of
privacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment
was thought necessary." (New Jersey i T.0., 469 U.S. 325, 357
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).)
Domestic terrorism
The serial sniper's repeated killings in the vicinity of the na-
tion's capital led many to fear that he was a terrorist. (See Police
to Sniper: 'Call us Backl' BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 22, 2002, at IA.)
The possibility of domestic terrorism necessarily affects any
Fourth Amendment analysis. In the seminal case United States v
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972), the
Supreme Court recognized the distinction between domestic ter-
rorism and ordinary crime, stating, "[Diomestic security surveil-
lance may involve different policy and practical considerations
from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime'. . . .Different standards
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment [in domestic se-
curity cases]:'
The term "domestic terrorism" admittedly requires a more
precise definition than currently exists. Nonetheless, when police
have reason to believe, as they arguably did in the serial sniper
case, that domestic terrorism is involved, the degree of probable
cause necessary to support searches of cars stopped at check-
points may be appropriately reduced. This is already the case with
foreign-intelligence searches. (See United States m. Nicholson,
955 E Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Va. 1997) (upholding foreigni-intelli-
gence searches conducted with warrants issued under a greatly re-
duced standard of probable cause).)
The approaches of state courts
Every state supreme court to consider the issue has upheld the
use of checkpoints to catch escaping suspects in the wake of seri-
ous crimes, usually by applying a balancing test comparing the
limited scope of the invasion to the magnitude of the governmen-
tal interest at stake. (See, e.g., State v Gascon, 811 P.2d 1103,
1106 (Id. 1989).) These courts have held that individualized sus-
picion to stop cars is not required because "[w]hen a serious
crime has been committed... it is necessary and therefore justifi-
able to resort to measures which otherwise might be considered
improper intrusions, such as setting up roadblocks and checking
cars or conveyances in the area." (State v. Torres, 508 P.2d 534,
536 (Utah 1973); see also State v, Silvenail, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980).) No state court has ever concluded that a
state constitution offers greater protection against sniper-type
roadblocks than the federal Constitution.
Most of these cases, however, would not support the erection
of roadblocks across three separate jurisdictions (Virginia, Mary-
land, and Washington, D.C.) to cover all possible major escape
routes. In virtually all of the state cases in which checkpoints
were upheld, police established only one checkpoint along a route
on which they had reason to believe the escaping suspect may be
traveling. For instance, in State v. Gascon, the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld a checkpoint at a particular bridge because it "pro-
vided the nearest access to an interstate highway." (811 P.2d at
1106.) The Alaska Supreme Court permitted the establishment of
a roadblock "across the only road exiting the [crime scene] suit-
able for passenger cars." (Lacy ,. State, 608 P2d 19, 20 (Alaska
1980).) Sinilarly, in State v. Silvernail, a Washington state court
approved a roadblock at the exit to a dock where the police be-
lieved burglars were disembarking from a ferry. (605 P.2d at
1281.) The Washington court stressed that "the availability of al-
ternative paths of escape could render a roadblock unreasonable
.... [T]he information. . . that suspects fled in a particular direc-
tion must be reliable" (d. at 1283; see also State v. Claussen, 522
N.W.2d 196, 197 (S.D. 1994) (upholding roadblock "on the only
road leading out of the [crime scene]").) A notable exception is
State v Tykwinski, 824 R2d 761,762 (Ariz. 1991), in which the
Arizona Supreme Court approved a system of roadblocks to catch
a cop killer.
The conduct permaitted by state courts at sniper-type check-
points varies widely. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed police
only to make drivers "proceed[] slowly through the temporary
roadblock while officers visually checked for persons matching
the robbery suspect's description." (Gascon, 811 P2d at 1107.) In-
dividualized suspicion was required before a car could be made to
stop. (Id. at 1108.) The Washington Court of Appeals and the Ari-
zona Supreme Court, in contrast, permitted police to stop and
search cars (including their trunks) at checkpoints without even
individualized suspicion. (Sil'enail, 605 P2d at 1283; Tykwinski,
824 P2d at 762.) Thus, some states are willing to allow police to
go further than federal courts permit.
Conclusion
You don't need to see his identification.... These aren't the
droids you're looking fir
-- Obi-Wan Kenobi at a vehicle checkpoint in
the film Star Wars
The car used by the two suspects in the Washington-area sniper
attacks was stopped at leastfve times at roadblocks thrown up
immediately by police after many of the shootings.
-"Cops' Missed Opportunities," Newsday
(Oct. 6, 2002, at A5.)
As both fiction and reality demonstrate, checkpoints are far
from a foolproof method of ensuring the apprehension of fugi-
tives. Nevertheless, they can sometimes be one of the only alter-
natives available to the police. While the government's "special
need" to apprehend dangerous felons justifies brief stops of all ve-
hicles at sniper checkpoints, probable cause (or consent) is re-
quired to justify searches of detained cars, unless the case involves
a sufficiently strong link to domestic terrorism. Because most state
constitutions have not been interpreted as offering greater protec-
tion against sniper checkpoints, they remain a constitutionally vi-
able strategy for both state and federal agents to utilize. U
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The proliferation of drug courts is testament to their suc-
cess, as are the numerous local and national evaluations now
being published throughout the country. In nearly all of the
studies, researchers have concluded that drug court participants
commit new crimes at a significantly lower rate than those who
do not participate.
Drug courts continue to save lives, one at a time. For some
addicts, drug court provides the
structure, incentive, and encour-
agement to fight the daily battle
against relapse. They have eing
proven that treatment without
sanctions is no more effective
than sanctions without treatment. m ight jiU.
- a
Finding new money in a Tn e ir
time of deficits
In King County, where I have
been the elected prosecutor since
1979, we have had a successful drug court since 1994. Like
many fledgling drug courts, ours was started with grant money
that soon ran out. In order to keep drug treatment as a realistic
and permanent option for those who need it, we had to find an-
other source of money. Even though drug court had proven it-
self worthy of a place at the criminal justice table, more than
70 percent of the county budget was already devoted to crimi-
nal justice costs. There was no new money to take on new
treatment programs or fill the gaps left when grants ran out.
I turned to the state legislature with a proposal that would
reprogram existing dollars from prison cells to treatment pro-
grams. Coming from a Republican prosecutor with a reputa-
tion for being "tough on crime;' my proposal to reduce sen-
tences for drug delivery crimes was taken seriously.
Washington State's sentencing scheme had sentenced drug
dealers to 21-27 months in the state prison system regardless
of the amount of drugs sold or the presence of addiction. This
sentence was adopted in the late 1980s in response to the epi-
demic of crack cocaine that swept the nation's urban areas. Al-
though that sentencing scheme was an appropriate response to a
major problem, the consequences to the state prison population
and budget were predictable and significant. Because so much of
the budget was spent on corrections, little was left over to inte-
grate drug treatment within the
criminal justice system.
Our legislation set its sights on
-rested the state prison budget, reduced
the sentence from an average of
24 months for drug dealing to anst save average of 17.5 months, and cap-
tured the resulting savings to be
ives. spent on drug treatment programns
for defendants charged with
felony crimes. Drug dealers still
go to prison in Washington, but
for a shorter period of time, and
with the opportunity to receive drug treatment both in prison and
upon release back into the community.
In the 2002 session, the Washington State Legislature did
what we asked: It reduced prison sentences, identified the sav-
ings within the state prison system, and sent that money to lo-
cal jurisdictions to fund drug treatment within the county
criminal justice systems. This year, up to $8 million will be
distributed for drug treatment within our state's criminal jus-
tice system.
For those with a serious drug addiction, getting arrested and
charged with a felony is not their biggest problem. In fact, if we
design our systems right, being arrested might just save their
lives. In Washington State, we have taken an important step to-
ward making drug treatment a true option within the justice
system. 0
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